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This paper examines time-series and cross-country 
variations in default risk co-dependence in the global 
banking system. The authors construct a default risk 
measure for all publicly traded banks using the Merton 
contingent claim model, and examine the evolution of 
the correlation structure of default risk for more than 
1,800 banks in more than 60 countries. They find that 
there has been a significant increase in default risk co-
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dependence over the three-year period leading to the 
financial crisis. They also find that countries that are more 
integrated, and that have liberalized financial systems and 
weak banking supervision, have higher co-dependence in 
their banking sector. The results support an increase in 
scope for international supervisory co-operation, as well 
as capital charges for “too-connected-to-fail” institutions 
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1.  Introduction 
The last decade has seen a tremendous transformation in the global financial sector.  
Globalization, innovations in communications technology and de-regulation have led to 
significant growth of financial institutions around the world.  These trends had positive economic 
benefits and have led to increased productivity, increased capital flows, lower borrowing costs, 
and better price discovery and risk diversification.  But the same trends have also led to greater 
linkages across financial institutions around the world as well as an increase in exposure of these 
institutions to common sources of risk.  The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that 
financial institutions around the world are highly inter-connected and that vulnerabilities in one 
market can easily spread to other markets outside of national boundaries.   
In this paper we examine whether the global trends described above have led to an 
increase in co-dependence in default risk of commercial banks around the world.  The growing 
expansion of financial institutions beyond national boundaries over the past decade has resulted 
in these institutions competing in increasingly similar markets, exposing them to common 
sources of market and credit risk. During the same period, rapid development of new financial 
instruments has created new channels of inter-dependency across these institutions.  Both 
increased interconnections and common exposure to risk makes the banking sector more 
vulnerable to economic, liquidity and information shocks.  There is substantial theoretical 
literature that models the various channels through which such shocks can culminate in a 
systemic banking crisis (see for instance Bhattacharya and Gale 1987, Allen and Gale 2000, 
Diamond and Rajan 2005; and focusing on the recent crisis, Brunnermeier 2009, Danielsson, 
Shin, and Zigrand 2009, Battiston et al. 2009 among others.)  To examine whether the global 
banking sector has become more interdependent and more fragile to shocks, we construct a 
default risk measure for all publicly traded banks using the Merton (1974) contingent claim 
model. We compute weekly time series of default probabilities for over 1,800 banks in over 60 
countries and examine the evolution of the correlation structure of default risk over the 1998 – 
2010 time period.   
Our empirical findings show that there has been a substantial increase in co-dependence 
in default risk of publicly traded banks starting around the beginning of 2004 leading up to the 3 
 
global financial crisis starting in the summer of 2007.   Although we observe an overall trend 
towards convergence in default risk globally, this trend has been much stronger for North 
American and European banks.  We also find that increase in co-dependence has been higher for 
banks that are larger (with greater than 50 billion in assets).  We also examine variation in co-
dependence across countries.  We find that countries that are more integrated, have liberalized 
financial systems and weak banking supervision have higher co-dependence in their banking 
sector.    
Increased co-dependence in credit risk in the banking sector has important implications 
for capital regulations. In the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis of 2007/08, there has been 
renewed interest in macro-prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system.  There 
has also been a growing consensus to adjust capital requirements to better reflect an individual 
bank‟s contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole (Brunnermeier, Crockett, 
Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin 2009, Financial Stability Forum 2009a, 2009b). Recently a number 
of papers have tried to measure and quantify systemic risk inherent in the global banking sector.  
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), Huang, Zhou, and Zhou (2009), Chan-Lau and Gravelle 
(2005), Avesani et al. (2006), and Elsinger and Lehar (2008), use a portfolio credit risk approach 
to compute the contribution of an individual bank to the risk of a portfolio of banks.  Our paper is 
related to this strand of literature, but our focus is not on quantifying systemic risk of large 
financial institutions but rather to examine time series trends for a large cross-section of banks.  
A number of papers have examined the correlation structure of equity returns of a subsample of 
banks.  De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) find rising correlations between bank stock returns in the 
U.S. from 1988 and 1999.  Schuler (2002) find similar results for Europe using a sample from 
1980 to 2001.  Hawkesby, Marsh and Stevens (2005) analyze co-movements in equity returns for 
a set of US and European large complex financial institutions using several statistical techniques 
and find a high degree of commonality.  This paper is also related to the literature that studies 
contagion in financial markets (see among others Forbes and Rigobon 2002, Kee-Hong Bae and 
Stulz 2003) and also the literature that examines the impact of globalization on convergence of 
asset prices (Bekeart and Wang 2009, Longin and Solnik 1995, Bekaert and Harvey 2000, and 
Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang 2009).   4 
 
This paper differs from the existing literature in three respects.  First, our empirical 
analyses cast a wider net than the existing literature which focuses only in a particular region or a 
country and covers a shorter time period.  Second we examine time series trends in co-
dependence and test for structural changes over time.  Finally, we examine cross-country 
differences in co-dependence and link the differences to measures of financial and economic 
openness and regulatory frameworks in different countries.   
Policymakers may be able to draw important implications from our analysis. Co-
dependence in bank default risk has important consequences for systemic stability.  We find 
increasing co-dependence in banks located in different national jurisdictions. Although we do 
find that strong banking supervision tends to reduce co-dependence in a given country, our 
results call for banking supervisory co-operation at a global level.  This is especially true for 
larger banks which have grown more interconnected over the past decade.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data sources and 
describes the construction of the Merton (1974) default risk measure.  Section 3 presents the 
empirical results, and finally Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Data Sources and Credit Risk Measure 
The key variables for our analysis come from BANKSCOPE which provides bank-level balance 
sheet information, and DATASTREAM which provides information on stock prices, market 
capitalization and stock volume.  We use weekly market data and annual accounting information 
in creating our credit risk measure.  All data items are in US dollars to make comparisons across 
countries possible.  We compute default probabilities implied from the structural credit risk 
model of Merton (1974).  This approach treats the equity value of a company as a call option on 
the company‟s assets.  The probability of default is computed using the “distance-to-default” 
measure, which is the difference between the asset value of the firm and the face value of its 
debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the firm‟s asset value.  The Merton (1974) distance-to-
default measure has been shown to be good predictor of defaults outperforming accounting-
based models (Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi 2008; Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt, 
2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008).  Although the Merton distance-to-default measure is more 5 
 
commonly used in bankruptcy prediction in the corporate sector, Merton (1977) points out the 
applicability of the contingent claims approach to pricing deposit insurance in the banking 
context.  Bongini, Laeven, and Majnoni (2002), Bartram, Brown and Hundt (2008) and others 
have used the Merton model to measure default probabilities of commercial banks.   
We follow Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) to calculate 
Merton‟s distance-to-default.  The market equity value of a company is modeled as a call option 
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Above  E V  is the market value of a bank.   A V  is the value of bank‟s assets. X is the face value of 
debt maturing at time T.  r is the risk-free rate and ¶  is the dividend rate expressed in terms of 
A V .   A s  is the volatility of the value of assets, which is related to equity volatility through the 
following equation: 
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We simultaneously solve the above two equations to find the values of  A V  and A s .   
We use the market value of equity for  E V  and short-term plus one half long-term 
liabilities to proxy for the face value of debt X. We have found similar results using short term 
debt plus currently due portion of long term liabilities plus demand deposits as the default 
barrier.  Since the accounting information is on an annual basis, we linearly interpolate the 
values for all dates over the period, using end of year values for accounting items. The 
interpolation method has the advantage of producing a smooth implied asset value process and 
avoids jumps in the implied default probabilities at year end.  E s  is the standard deviation of 6 
 
weekly equity returns over the past 12 months.  In calculating standard deviation, we require the 
company to have at least 36 non-zero and non-missing returns over the previous 12 months. T 
equals one year, and r is the one-year treasury bill rate, which we take to be the risk free rate. 
The dividend rate, d, is the sum of the prior year‟s common and preferred dividends divided by 
the market value of assets.  We use the Newton method to simultaneously solve the two 
equations above.  For starting values for the unknown variables we use,  AE V V X =+ , and 
() A E E E V V X ss =+ .    Once we determine asset values,  A V , we then compute asset returns as 
in Hillegeist et al. (2004):  ( ) , , 1 max 1, t A t A t V V r m - =-
  
As expected returns cannot be 
negative, if asset returns are below zero they are set to the risk-free rate.
1  Merton‟s distance-to-
default is finally computed as:  
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The default probability is the normal transform of the distance-to-default measure, 
defined as:                     The summary statistics for the distance-to-default measure 
are provided in Table 1.  In the table we also report the number of banks covered by both 
BANKSCOPE and DATASTREAM as well as the number of banks that remain after we impose 
data filters described above.  In all, we have 1,942 banks in 68 countries for which we are able to 
calculate Merton DD measure.  Figure 1 plots the value weighted average distance-to-default 
measure over time.  Table 2 provides annual average distance-to-default measure for different 
regions.  In the analyses that follow we focus on log changes in default probability:         .   
In addition we use a number of country level variables to explain co-dependence in the 
banking sector across countries.  These measures relate to financial development, financial 
structure, as well as to financial and economic integration.  We also use measures of banking 
regulation and supervision as explanatory variables.  The first table in the appendix, Table A1, 
provides an overview of the definitions and sources of these variables. Table A2 presents 
                                                            
1 We obtain similar results if we use a 6% equity premium instead of asset returns as in CHS (2008). 7 
 
summary statistics.  In the next section we explain the various measures of co-dependence used 
in the analyses. 
3.  Co-dependence in the Banking Sector  
3.1  Co-dependence Measures 
There are a number of different approaches to measuring co-dependence.  In this paper we use 
three complementary measures.   The first is the variance ratio calculated as the ratio of the 
average variance of changes in log probability of default divided by the variance of the average 
changes in log default probability: 
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The variance ratio increases as correlations in changes in default risk between banks 
increase.  If the correlations are one, then the log variance ratio takes on a value of zero.  The 
variance ratio has been previously used by Ferreira and Gama (2005) and Bakert and Wang 
(2010) in examining convergence of asset prices in international markets. Figure 2 plots variance 
ratio calculated on annual basis for all banks in our sample.   
The second measure we use is derived from quantile regressions, which estimate the 
functional relationship among variables at different quantiles (Koenker and Hallock 2001). 
Quantile regression allows for a more accurate estimation of the credit risk co-dependence 
during stress periods by taking into account nonlinear relationships when there is a large negative 
shock.  We model the changes in a default risk of a particular bank as a function of changes in 
default risk of all banks: 
 
                                            
 
 
              
 
   
  
 






The estimation of a quantile regression relies on the minimization of the sum of residuals. 
The residuals are weighted asymmetrically depending on the quantile,   , estimated (Koenker 
and Hallock 2001). Other financial studies using the quantile regression approach include 
Koenker and Bassett (1978), Engle and Manganelli (2004), and more recently Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2009) and Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010).  Figure 3 plots the betas calculated 
by estimating equation (5) for each year for all the banks in our sample using the 0.90 quantile. 
In contrast to the second measure which focuses on large changes in default risk in the 
banking sector, our final measure focuses on collective behavior that may precede these very 
large changes.  Asset correlations increase dramatically during crisis periods when there are large 
swings in asset prices (see for instance Ang and Chen 2002).  In other words, correlations tend to 
increase when the magnitudes of changes in prices are large.  Since we are interested in 
interdependence in the banking sector, we also want to analyze periods when co-dependence 
may be high even when the magnitude of changes in default risk is low.  With the final measure, 
following Harmon et al. (2011), we focus on the fraction of banks whose default risk moves in 
the same direction.  This measure can more accurately capture collective behavior and mimicry 
that may culminate in a crisis.  We slightly modify the methodology used by Harmon et al. 
(2011) and measure the 52 week rolling standard deviation of the fraction of banks that have 
positive change in their default probability in a given week:   
 
                  
 
 
                 
 





Above   is an indicator function.  First we compute the fraction of banks with a positive 
increase in credit risk and then compute the time series standard deviation of this measure.  If the 
changes in credit risk are random across banks then the standard deviation will be zero.  As co-
dependence increases so does our measure.  Figure 4 plots this co-movement measure calculated 
on an annual basis using all banks in our sample.   9 
 
3.2  Commonality in Default Risk 
Before examining time-series variation in co-dependence for the three measures we have 
outlined above, we first explore commonality in changes in default for the whole sample period.  
We begin by examining correlation in changes in default risk between different regions. To 
compute these correlations, we first calculate value-weighted changes in log default probability, 
        , for each region and then compute correlations over the sample period.  Table 2 
presents the matrix of pairwise correlations across regions.  The correlations are fairly high 
across regions except for the Middle and North Africa region.  The correlations range from -8% 
to over 90% with an average of 50%.  Next, we conduct a standard principal components 
analysis on the covariance of weekly changes in default probabilities.  The results are reported in 
Table 4.  The first principal component explains more than 60 percent of the variation, while the 
first three principal components explain close to 90 percent. The principal component analyses 
results suggest that there is a significant amount of commonality in the variation of default risk 
changes. Furthermore, the first principal component consists of a roughly uniform weighting of 
default risk changes for countries in our sample.  The first principal component, thus, resembles 
a global factor affecting the default risk changes of all banks.  Consistent with this result we 
observe significant clustering of changes in bank default probabilities.  Figure 5 shows the 
percentage of banks that had their worst change in default risk in the same week over a 12 month 
time period. If the changes in credit risk are independent we would expect to see an even 
distribution of worst changes in default risk for banks over time.  In other words we would 
expect to see a flat line with no spikes.  Instead, we see significant clustering.  The extent of 
clustering during the recent financial crisis is especially dramatic.  
To explore further the systematic variation in changes in bank default risk, we follow the 
methodology of Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and decompose changes in default risk into 
three components: global effect, country effects and asset size effects.  The rationale for 
including asset size is the substantial increase in bank size and concentration over the sample 
period we study (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizianga 2010).  The larger banks tend operate beyond 
national borders and compete in similar markets and activities.  As larger banks tend to engage in 
risk-transfer with other banks of similar size, they share many linkages and are exposed to 
significant counter-party risk.  For these reasons there maybe commonality in default risk in 10 
 
larger banks distinct from the rest of the banking sector.  Following Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizianga (2010), we classify banks into three size categories: banks with assets less than 10 
billion, assets between 10 to 50 billion and assets greater than 50 billion.  We model log changes 
in default probability as follows: 
 
                        
 
   
           
 
   
          
 
(7) 
Above        is a dummy variable equal to one, if bank   belongs to size group  , and zero 
otherwise.         is a dummy variable equal to one, if bank   is headquartered in country  , and 
zero otherwise. In total we have three size groups (     ) and 47 countries (      ).  Following 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), we impose restrictions in order to avoid multi-collinearity 
when estimating the parameters of the model.  In particular, we impose the country and size 
effects weighted by the number of banks to be zero:        
 
             and        
 
            
with       and       equal to the number of banks in each size category j and country k, 
respectively.  For each period t, we run a cross-sectional regression to estimate the coefficients, 
        , and    .  For each individual bank belonging to country k and in size group j, the 
proportion of systematic variance explained by country effects is approximately given by:  
        
                            The proportion of systematic variance explained by size and global 
effects are computed in a similar fashion.  Table 5 shows the results from this decomposition.  
We report averages by region to save space.  On average the global effect accounts for 20% of 
the systematic variation in changes in default risk.   Asset size accounts for modest portion of 
systematic variation, on average 7%.  But for larger banks with assets greater than fifty billion 
dollars, size accounts for 26% of the systematic variation. These results indicate that that there is 
a significant global component to changes in default risk in the banking sectors across different 
countries. 11 
 
3.3  Time Series Analyses 
In this section, we examine time series variation of co-dependence in the banking sector.  In 
particular we are interested in whether there have been structural shifts in co-dependence over 
the sample period from 1998 to 2010.  Following Bakeart and Wang (2009) we use trend tests to 
detect potential changes in co-dependence.  We compute the variance ratio (   ) for each region 
over 52 week rolling intervals.
2   We use the following empirical model: 
 
                                                                                   
                                                                                        
(8) 
Where             is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one over the specified time 
period, and t is the linear time trend.  In estimating the coefficients, we correct for auto 
correlation. We split the sample into three intervals.  Time period from June 2007 to December 
2009 corresponds roughly to the global financial crises.  Although it is difficult pin down the 
exact date, it was towards the end of June 2007 when the first significant signs of the crisis began 
to appear.  Market uncertainty increased and spreads started to widen significantly as subprime 
mortgage backed securities were discovered in portfolios of banks and hedge funds around the 
world.  Few weeks later, BNP ceased redemptions in three of its funds due to “complete 
evaporation of liquidity” in the markets.
3   January 2004 to June 2007 is the period leading up the 
subprime crisis.  It was around the beginning of 2004 when there began a substantial increase in 
subprime lending, growth of so-called shadow banking (Gorton 2011), increase in leverage of 
major financial institutions and reliance in short-term borrowing (Adrian and Shin 2011, Morris 
and Shin 2009) as well as increase in global imbalances (Jagannathan, Kapoor and Schaumburg 
2009) that culminated in a crisis starting the summer of 2007. 
The results from the empirical model in equation (8) are reported in Table 6.  There is an 
increase in co-dependence during the crises period (July 2007 to December 2009) for all regions.  
                                                            





In fact there is not a single country which did not see an increase in co-dependence during this 
period.  However we do see variation in the magnitude of the increase across countries and to 
some extent regions.  For the time period leading up to the crises (January 2004 to June 2007), 
we see much greater variation.  There was an increase in co-dependence throughout most of the 
developed world.  Banks in United States, Japan and especially European Union have seen a 
significant rise in co-dependence.  Banks located in developing countries on the other hand have 
seen a decline in co-dependence over the same time period.  As with the crisis period, we again 
see much variation across countries.  It is these cross-sectional differences that we explore next. 
3.4  Cross-country Analyses 
In this section we examine the cross-country differences in default risk co-dependence.  A 
number of papers have linked commonality in asset returns and asset liquidity to financial and 
trade liberalization.
4  We are interested in whether policies that lead to financial and economic 
openness and greater integration also increase co-dependence.  We are also interested in the 
extent to which banking de-regulation and banking supervision has led to changes in co-
dependence.  The empirical model we use to test these relationships is the following: 
                                                          (9) 
Our dependent variable is the variance ratio,      , calculated for each country i for each 
year t.  We obtain similar results using the co-movement measure or the quantile betas described 
in Section 3.1. Since correlations increase during crises periods, we include a dummy variable, 
          , that takes on a value of one if a country in our sample has experienced a banking 
crises in a given year.  We use the banking crisis definition and the data provided in Leaven and 
Valencia (2010).      is a vector of country level variables that measure economic/financial 
openness and banking regulation/supervision.      is a vector of country level controls.  We use 
GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth to control for levels of economic and financial 
development.  Previous literature has shown that more developed countries tend to have lower 
commonality in asset prices and liquidity (see for instance Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk 2009).  To 
                                                            
4 See for instance Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2009) and Bekaert and Wang (2009).   13 
 
control for differences in financial structure, we use stock market capitalization over GDP and 
bank deposits over GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000).  We may expect to see 
differences in co-dependence in bank vs. market based systems.  We also include liquid assets 
ratio and capital ratio to control for the funding liquidity of the domestic financial system (Beck 
and Demirgüç-Kunt 2004).  Overall liquidity in the financial system may reduce or eliminate 
some channels of contagion which increase co-dependence.  Finally we control for the log of the 
number of banks in the sample, since correlation may be mechanically linked to the number of 
cross-sectional observations (Morck 2000).  We also exclude countries with less than 7 banks 
from the analyses.  The regressions include country fixed effects (  ) and we report robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Cross-sectional regression results are reported in Table 7.  As expected we find the 
coefficient on the bank-crises dummy to be significant and positive.  That is co-dependence 
increases significantly during crises periods.  As mentioned earlier, consistent with the prior 
literature we find gdp per capita growth to reduce co-dependence, although the level of GDP per 
capita is insignificant.  We find stock market capitalization over GDP to increase co-dependence. 
One possible explanation is that more market based systems have more potential channels of 
contagion.  Surprisingly, the coefficient on the liquid assets ratio is negative and significant.  The 
capital assets ratio is insignificant.   
As mentioned earlier we are particularly interested in the impact of financial and 
economic openness and integration on co-dependence.  We are also interested in the extent to 
which banking de-regulation and banking supervision can explain cross-country differences in 
co-dependence.  We use a number of different variables to measure integration and financial 
openness.  The first measure is stock market turnover which has a positive statistically 
significant effect on co-dependence. Trade over GDP has been previously used in the literature 
to measure economic integration (Bekaert and Wang 2009). We do not find it to be significant 
after controls.  The Chin-Ito measure quantifies capital control policies and other regulations and 
restrictions on capital flows (Chin and Ito 2008).  It shows up positive and significant.  We also 
consider the impact of social and political integration.  We use the KOF political and social 14 
 
globalization index (Dreher et al. 2000).
5  Political integration variable shows up as significant 
and positive while the social integration variable is insignificant.   
Next we examine the impact of deregulation and financial liberalization on co-
dependence.  We use the database created by Abiad Detragiatche and Tressel (2010) that 
quantifies financial reforms over a thirty year time period.  Results under models 6 and 7 show 
that reforms that have led to international capital liberalization and stock market liberalization 
have increased co-dependence.  Reforms that have led to stronger bank supervision, however, 
have decreased co-dependence (model 8). We also examine the impact of bank concentration as 
measured by assets of 3 largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks.  As 
mentioned earlier, there has been a substantial increase in concentration in both developing and 
developed countries.  As the recent crisis has demonstrated, large complex financial institutions 
can cause systemic disruptions affecting all other financial institutions.  We find concentration to 
increase co-dependence.  This is in contrast to Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) who 
show that countries with a more concentrated banking system are less likely to suffer a systemic 
banking crisis.  Finally, we examine the impact of moral hazard on co-dependence.  If there is an 
implicit guarantee provided by the State to cover losses stemming from a systemic crisis, banks 
will have incentives to take on correlated risks (Acharya 2005).  Guaranteed banks will not have 
incentives to diversify their operations, since the guarantee takes effect only if other banks fail as 
well.  We use the deposit insurance coverage ratio (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2004) as a proxy 
for moral hazard.  We find a positive and significant relationship between moral hazard and co-
dependence.  Overall, our results suggest that countries which are more integrated, and which 
have liberalized financial systems and weak banking supervision also have higher co-dependence 
in their banking sector. 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper examines time-series and cross-country variations in default risk co-dependence in 
the global banking sector.  We compute weekly changes in default probabilities based on the 
Merton (1974) model for over 1,800 banks in over 70 countries.  We show that systematic 
default risk has a significant global component in the banking sector accounting for 20% of the 
                                                            
5 KOF means “Konjunkturforschungsstelle” - Swiss Economic Institute. 15 
 
systematic variation.  During the global financial crisis, there has been a uniform increase in co-
dependence across all countries.  However, we do find cross-sectional differences in the 
magnitude of the increase across different countries.  We also find that there has been a 
significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the three year period leading up to the 
financial crisis. During this time period we find even greater cross-country variation, with banks 
located in the developed countries (and especially banks located in the US and the European 
Union) seeing an increase co-dependence while banks located in developing countries seeing a 
decrease.  Examining the 1998-2010 time period, we find that countries which are more 
integrated, and which have liberalized financial systems and weak banking supervision and 
greater safety net coverage also have higher co-dependence in their banking sector. The results in 
this paper have important policy implications.  Most importantly, our results support an increase 
in scope for international supervisory co-operation, as well as capital charges for too-connected-
to-fail‟ institutions that can impose significant externalities. 16 
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Figure 1. Global Distance-to-Default 
This figure shows the weekly weighted-average distance-to-default of all banks satisfying the data 




















Figure 2. Variance Ratio 
This figure shows the variance ratio calculated as the ratio of the average variance of changes in 
log probability of default divided by the variance of the average changes in log default probability 



















Figure 3. Quantile Regression Estimates 
This figure shows the Beta coefficient estimates from the quantile regression specified in equation 






















Figure 4. Co-movement Measure 
This figure shows the co-movement measure (specified in equation (6) of the paper) calculated as 
the 52 week rolling standard deviation of the fraction of banks that have positive change in their 
default probability in a given week.  The co-movement measure is computed each year using 
weekly data. 
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Figure 5. Clustering in Default Risk 
This figure shows the percentage of banks in a given week that have simultaneous worst change in 
default risk over a 12 month time period.  We compute log changes in default probability each 
week for each bank in our dataset.  Each year, we then count the number of banks that had their 
worst change in log default probability in the same week.  We then divide this count by the total 





Table 1: Data Coverage and Summary Statistics of Distance-Default. 
This table shows the summary statistics for the distance-to-default measure for countries for which we have at least 
one observation. Our original data from both BankScope and Datastream covers 2,294 publicly traded banks across 86 
countries. Of these banks, 1,942 of them satisfy our requirement that 1) they have at least 36 weekly non-zero volume 
and non-missing returns over the previous 12 months, 2) they have non-missing liabilities and market capitalization, in 
order to  compute distance-to-default. 
Country 










p5  p50  p95 
ARGENTINA  8  8  4.09  1.81  1.87  3.80  7.81 
AUSTRIA  14  13  9.33  3.22  2.77  10.83  12.00 
AUSTRALIA  20  19  6.47  1.95  3.05  6.56  9.73 
BELGIUM  6  6  6.99  2.98  1.84  6.78  12.00 
BAHRAIN  16  11  5.30  2.26  2.30  4.87  9.98 
BERMUDA  17  13  4.02  2.24  1.46  3.53  8.84 
BRAZIL  30  25  3.88  2.07  1.35  3.39  8.14 
CANADA  20  18  6.60  2.63  2.71  6.28  12.00 
SWITZERLAND  24  24  7.63  3.44  2.56  7.24  12.00 
CHILE  9  8  6.00  2.41  2.40  5.76  11.70 
CHINA-PEOPLE'S REP.  12  12  4.68  1.86  2.21  4.48  8.03 
COLOMBIA  9  6  4.83  1.63  2.59  4.80  7.87 
CZECH REPUBLIC  3  2  5.33  2.62  1.94  4.67  11.68 
GERMANY  31  30  6.90  3.48  1.99  6.54  12.00 
DENMARK  20  18  7.56  2.59  3.33  7.51  12.00 
EGYPT  3  3  3.83  1.40  2.20  3.40  6.03 
SPAIN  12  12  6.85  2.57  3.06  6.62  11.65 
FINLAND  7  7  6.66  2.71  2.34  6.41  11.65 
FRANCE  58  55  8.42  3.41  2.73  8.71  12.00 
UNITED KINGDOM  53  50  5.78  2.75  1.87  5.32  11.30 25 
 
GREECE  18  17  3.90  1.75  1.69  3.68  6.93 
HONG KONG SAR, 
CHINA  17  16  4.72  2.45  1.55  4.24  9.70 
HUNGARY  3  3  4.25  1.60  1.80  3.93  7.64 
INDONESIA  20  15  2.47  1.04  0.91  2.39  4.11 
IRELAND  6  5  6.02  2.53  1.29  5.79  10.32 
ISRAEL  12  8  6.92  2.23  3.56  6.72  11.16 
INDIA  29  26  4.14  1.86  1.73  3.84  7.45 
ICELAND  7  6  4.22  1.35  1.87  4.29  6.58 
ITALY  43  38  6.58  2.76  2.60  6.17  12.00 
JORDAN  12  11  4.86  1.43  2.80  4.61  7.35 
JAPAN  164  160  7.06  3.05  2.46  6.98  12.00 
KENYA  9  7  4.57  3.03  1.97  3.34  12.00 
KOREA REP. OF  16  13  4.35  2.25  1.47  4.00  9.76 
KUWAIT  22  22  4.59  1.87  1.74  4.47  7.93 
KAZAKHSTAN  9  1  2.73  0.35  2.28  2.61  3.40 
LEBANON  6  1  6.95  2.07  4.25  7.25  10.21 
LIECHTENSTEIN  2  2  6.76  2.16  3.50  6.76  12.00 
SRI LANKA  13  8  5.04  1.94  2.30  4.91  8.39 
LITHUANIA  5  3  4.01  1.38  1.67  4.18  6.07 
LUXEMBOURG  7  6  7.37  3.04  3.19  6.70  12.00 
MOROCCO  6  6  6.56  2.09  3.50  6.40  10.31 
MAURITIUS  2  2  8.67  1.95  6.52  7.67  12.00 
MEXICO  14  10  5.70  3.04  1.87  4.89  12.00 
MALAYSIA  29  29  4.71  2.37  1.14  4.42  9.18 
NETHERLANDS  12  12  6.21  3.07  2.44  5.37  12.00 
NORWAY  22  22  9.18  3.02  3.35  10.18  12.00 
NEW ZEALAND  1  1  8.12  2.22  5.11  7.79  11.68 
OMAN  3  3  4.33  1.41  2.12  4.45  6.44 
PERU  4  4  4.87  1.87  2.42  4.45  8.68 26 
 
PHILIPPINES  17  16  4.18  1.97  1.67  3.85  8.19 
PAKISTAN  17  14  4.05  1.73  1.68  3.77  7.61 
POLAND  15  15  3.69  1.42  1.65  3.55  6.21 
PORTUGAL  9  8  6.96  2.87  3.02  6.39  12.00 
QATAR  6  6  3.49  0.94  2.09  3.38  5.41 
ROMANIA  3  2  3.41  1.32  1.25  3.49  5.41 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  15  7  3.61  1.90  1.16  3.19  7.31 
SAUDI ARABIA  10  10  4.06  1.64  2.19  3.59  7.39 
SWEDEN  11  11  5.05  2.41  1.83  4.64  9.82 
SINGAPORE  17  17  5.47  2.82  1.64  4.96  11.11 
SLOVENIA  7  2  5.78  1.01  4.24  5.77  7.64 
SLOVAKIA  4  3  7.78  3.24  2.53  8.00  12.00 
THAILAND  29  28  3.55  1.66  1.04  3.37  6.50 
TURKEY  24  22  2.56  0.84  1.34  2.55  3.90 
TAIWAN, CHINA  36  34  4.59  2.00  1.97  4.19  8.57 
UKRAINE  6  1  2.69  0.41  2.23  2.61  3.54 
USA  1064  916  5.80  2.42  2.20  5.54  10.34 
VENEZUELA  8  6  4.02  2.24  1.86  3.34  9.60 











Table 2: Distance-to-Default Regional Time Series 
This table shows the weighted-average distance-to-default measure for 9 different regions computed each year. We calculate 
weighted-average  distance-to-default  by  market  capitalization  each  week  for  each  region.  We  then  compute  arithmetic 
averages across 52 weeks in a given year.   
 
regions  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Africa  3.49  1.92  3.42  4.17  3.83  4.81  4.87  5.02  4.72  4.27  4.04  2.62  4.39 
Central Asia & Eastern Europe  2.29  2.07  2.80  3.12  3.77  4.50  4.20  4.34  3.74  4.08  3.64  1.65  2.73 
East Asia and Pacific  4.44  3.64  4.65  4.98  4.75  6.07  6.23  7.65  7.49  6.11  4.36  3.13  4.59 
Japan  4.37  3.68  4.17  5.60  5.39  5.39  4.70  6.51  5.35  6.31  5.16  4.81  7.30 
Latin America & Caribbean  3.23  2.93  3.77  4.29  4.78  4.42  5.39  5.18  4.19  4.32  3.32  2.11  4.11 
Middle East & North Africa  6.97  5.89  6.78  8.19  8.97  6.77  7.12  5.17  4.20  4.67  4.62  2.88  4.98 
North America  4.87  3.89  3.46  3.89  5.19  5.65  8.05  8.79  8.92  8.47  4.47  1.68  3.88 
South Asia  4.75  3.65  3.56  4.85  5.64  6.39  4.32  4.20  4.33  3.90  3.07  2.35  3.36 










Table 3: Regional Distance-to-Default Correlations 
This table reports the time-series correlations from 1998 to 2010 between different regions. First, we calculate weighted-
average distance-to-default by market capitalization in each region per week. Then the pair wise Pearson correlation 
coefficients are calculated from weekly data.  
 
 
Africa  CAEE  EAP  Japan  LAC  MENA  NA  SA  WE 
Africa  1 
                Central Asia & Eastern Europe  0.7709  1 
              East Asia and Pacific  0.7643  0.7709  1 
            Japan  0.5986  0.5320  0.5142  1 
          Latin America & Caribbean  0.7357  0.8035  0.7656  0.4834  1 
        Middle East & North Africa  0.1221  0.2428  -0.0128  -0.0701  0.4400  1 
      North America  0.6356  0.7283  0.8773  0.3969  0.7010  -0.0086  1 
    South Asia  0.3013  0.4732  0.3883  0.1759  0.4986  0.6411  0.2996  1 









Table 4: Principal Component Decomposition of Changes in Credit Risk 
This table reports the first five components from a principle components analysis of default risk. First, we compute value-
weighted average changes in log default probability for banks in our dataset. The market capitalizations are used as weights. 
We then perform a principal component decomposition.  Eigenvalues, marginal and cumulative proportion variances are 
reported respectively. 
   
Proportion of Variance Explained 
Component  Eigenvalue  Marginal  Cumulative 
Comp1  5.582  0.6202  0.6202 
Comp2  1.809  0.2010  0.8213 
Comp3  0.612  0.0679  0.8892 
Comp4  0.404  0.0449  0.9341 







Table 5: Variance Decomposition of Default Risk 
In this table, we report the systematic variance attributable to global, country and size effects. We use Heston & Rouwenhorst 
(1994)‟s method to decompose the systematic variance of changes in log default probability (        ).  Each week we run 30 
 
a cross-sectional regression of         onto a constant and 47 country dummy variables and 3 size dummy variables: 
                               
 
                 
         . In the regression,        is a dummy variable equal to one, if bank 
  belongs to size group  , and zero otherwise.         is a dummy variable equal to one, if bank   is headquartered in country 
 , and zero otherwise.  We impose restrictions in order to avoid multi-collinearity when estimating the parameters of the 
model.  In particular, we impose the country and size effects weighted by the number of banks to be zero:        
 
             
and        
 
            with        and        equal  to  the  number  of  banks  in  each  size  category  j  and  country  k, 
respectively.  For each period t, we run a cross-sectional regression to estimate the coefficients,         , and    .  For each 
individual bank belonging to country k and in size group j, the proportion of systematic variance explained by country effects 
is approximately given by:  
        
                            The proportion of systematic variance explained by size and global effects 
are computed in a similar fashion.  
Country  Number of Banks  Global Effect  Country Effect  Size Effect 
Panel A: Regions 
        Africa  34  28.30%  65.00%  6.71% 
Central Asia & Eastern Europe  62  21.44%  68.23%  10.33% 
East Asia and Pacific  201  11.84%  83.32%  4.85% 
Japan   161  11.35%  81.20%  7.45% 
Latin America & Caribbean  74  18.09%  75.12%  6.79% 
Middle East & North Africa  65  14.71%  80.51%  4.78% 
North America  964  44.19%  43.30%  12.52% 
South Asia  47  15.19%  80.32%  4.50% 
Western Europe  300  13.98%  77.93%  8.09% 
Panel B: Asset Size ($ billions)             
Assets less than $10  1464  54.76%  36.70%  8.54% 
Assets larger than $10 but less than $50  495  23.78%  61.28%  14.94% 
Assets larger than $50  276  17.22%  56.85%  25.93% 
Table 6: Time-series Analysis 
This table shows the regression estimates from equation (8) in the paper.  Following Bakeart and Wang (2009) we use trend 
tests to detect potential changes in co-dependence.  First, the variance ratio     ) is computed for each region each week 
over 52 week rolling intervals.  We use log changes in default probability and include banks with at least 26 observations to 31 
 
compute the variance ratio.  We then run the following regression: 
                                                                                                                  
                                                           Where             is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 
one over the specified time period, and t is the linear time trend.  In estimating the coefficients, we correct for auto correlation 
using Newey-West with three lags. 
 
  
World  Developed  Developing 
European 
Union 


















int           
1998.01 - 2003.12  -3.424***  -3.434***  -2.273***  -3.044***  -3.378***  -2.078***  -1.414***  -1.800***  -2.032***  -2.237***  -0.724***  -3.393***  -1.446***  -3.057*** 
  (-26.291)  (-26.015)  (-29.887)  (-25.238)  (-29.785)  (-34.073)  (-13.769)  (-44.343)  (-19.055)  (-41.373)  (-7.450)  (-30.109)  (-17.253)  (-24.015) 
slope    
1998.01 - 2003.12  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.003***  0.000  -0.001***  -0.000  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.003***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.000 
  (-3.645)  (-2.839)  (-12.327)  (0.307)  (-3.670)  (-0.499)  (-3.259)  (-10.576)  (-6.981)  (-7.024)  (-7.254)  (-3.373)  (-4.581)  (0.699) 
int           
2004.01 - 2007.06  -6.588***  -6.413***  -2.421***  -7.111***  -5.451***  -2.529***  0.432*  -3.169***  -2.588***  -2.482***  -0.706  -5.336***  -2.640***  -7.941*** 
  (-21.959)  (-18.918)  (-4.665)  (-16.365)  (-22.876)  (-10.212)  (1.653)  (-22.073)  (-6.415)  (-12.651)  (-1.093)  (-20.613)  (-7.338)  (-17.706) 
slope    
2004.01 - 2007.06  0.004***  0.004***  -0.004***  0.008***  0.002***  0.002***  -0.005***  0.001***  -0.002**  -0.001***  -0.005***  0.002***  0.001  0.009*** 
  (6.608)  (5.897)  (-3.188)  (8.921)  (4.161)  (3.892)  (-8.789)  (4.608)  (-2.361)  (-3.482)  (-3.637)  (3.297)  (1.621)  (10.630) 
int           
2007.07 - 2009.12  -11.953***  -11.616***  -12.650***  -11.422***  -10.315***  -1.344***  -8.000***  -11.175***  -10.057***  -8.404***  -10.293***  -10.443***  -9.735***  -10.694*** 
  (-25.455)  (-24.897)  (-19.020)  (-24.689)  (-17.376)  (-6.614)  (-14.525)  (-10.538)  (-37.861)  (-32.621)  (-17.243)  (-17.570)  (-26.888)  (-26.209) 
slope    
2007.06 - 2009.12  0.015***  0.014***  0.015***  0.015***  0.012***  0.000  0.011***  0.014***  0.013***  0.010***  0.012***  0.012***  0.013***  0.014*** 
   (19.754)  (19.380)  (14.475)  (19.703)  (12.893)  (0.828)  (12.084)  (8.660)  (29.477)  (23.109)  (12.933)  (13.128)  (21.483)  (20.395) 
N  662  662  662  662  662  662  662  662  662  662  662  662  662  662 
lags   3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
 
Table 7: Cross-country Regressions 
This  table  shows  the  results  from  cross-country  regressions  from  the  following  model:                                  
                    .  The dependent variable is the variance ratio,      , calculated for each country i for each year t, using log 
changes in default probabilities. The dummy variable,           , that takes on a value of one if a country in our sample has 32 
 
experienced a banking crises in a given year.  We use the banking crisis definition and the data provided in Leaven and Valencia 
(2010).      is a vector of country level controls, includes GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, stock market capitalization 
over GDP, bank deposits over GDP,  liquid assets ratio, capital ratio and  log of the number of banks. These variables are 
described in detail in the appendix.  In the regressions, we exclude countries with less than 7 banks.  The regressions include 
country fixed effects (  ) and we report robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
   M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6  M7  M8  M9  M10 
Stock mkt Cap / GDP  0.127*  0.136*  0.152*  0.228**  0.257**  0.213*  0.246**  0.139*  0.104  0.279* 
   (1.727)  (1.764)  (1.869)  (1.963)  (2.433)  (1.938)  (2.258)  (1.804)  (1.347)  (1.891) 
Bank Deposits / GDP  -0.05  0  0.035  0.258  0.199  -0.027  -0.116  -0.043  -0.002  0.102 
   (-0.187)  (0.001)  (0.118)  (0.891)  (0.627)  (-0.114)  (-0.511)  (-0.147)  (-0.007)  (0.43) 
Bank Crisis Dummy  0.273***  0.299***  0.294***  0.264***  0.286***  0.202**  0.195*  0.302***  0.273***  0.327*** 
   (2.696)  (2.949)  (2.836)  (2.62)  (2.745)  (1.99)  (1.896)  (3.054)  (2.719)  (3.063) 
Log # of Banks  -0.691***  -0.807***  -0.807***  -0.729***  -0.696***  -0.704***  -0.721***  -0.680***  -0.829***  -0.882*** 
   (-3.692)  (-3.951)  (-4.002)  (-3.849)  (-3.299)  (-8.008)  (-7.905)  (-3.440)  (-4.354)  (-2.771) 
Bank Capital / Assets  0.039*  0.019  0.022  0.021  0.026  0.012  0.013  0.013  0.016  0.018 
   (1.826)  (0.828)  (0.942)  (0.856)  (1.121)  (0.555)  (0.576)  (0.59)  (0.675)  (0.553) 
Liquid Assets Ratio  0.029**  0.035**  0.034**  0.039***  0.036**  0.039***  0.036***  0.041***  0.036**  0.039*** 
   (2.259)  (2.483)  (2.36)  (2.685)  (2.561)  (3.002)  (2.782)  (2.965)  (2.529)  (2.688) 
log GDP/cap  -0.007  0.025  0.02  -0.049  -0.169  -0.077  0.045  0.022  0.041  -0.062 
   (-0.067)  (0.222)  (0.166)  (-0.337)  (-1.092)  (-0.242)  (0.155)  (0.191)  (0.409)  (-0.456) 
GDP/cap growth  -0.033**  -0.039**  -0.040**  -0.049***  -0.039**  -0.058***  -0.059***  -0.048***  -0.037**  -0.048** 
   (-2.283)  (-2.435)  (-2.095)  (-2.946)  (-2.543)  (-4.015)  (-4.028)  (-3.384)  (-2.306)  (-2.196) 
Global integration and Financial Openness 
Stock mkt turnover  0.130***                            
   (2.933)                            
Chin-Ito Financial Openness     0.100**                         
      (1.971)                         
Trade / GDP        -0.001                      
         (-0.707)                      
KOF Social globalization           0.015                   33 
 
            (1.301)                   
KOF Political globalization              0.028**                
               (2.356)                
Regulation and Supervision 
Security market liberalization                 0.241***             
                  (3.998)             
International capital liberalization                    0.643***          
                     (7.537)          
Banking supervision                       -0.129**       
                        (-2.553)       
Bank concentration                          0.445*    
                           (1.867)    
Deposit Insurance Coverage                             0.211*** 
                              (3.178) 
Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







Table A1.  Country-Level Variables Used in the Empirical Analyses 
This table describes the country-level variables used in the analyses in this paper. The data sources are provided under the 
„Source‟ column. 34 
 
 
Variable Name  Description  Source 
Bank capital / assets  Bank capital to assets ratio % 
World Development 
Indicator (World Bank) 
Bank Concentration 
Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial 
banks. 
Financial Structure 
Database (World Bank)  
Bank Deposit / GDP 
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a share of 
GDP, calculated using the following deflation method: {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + 
Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is demand and time and saving 
deposits, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI 
Financial Structure 
Database (World Bank)  
Bank liquid reserves / assets  Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio % 
World Development 
Indicator (World Bank) 
Banking supervision  Measure of prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector 
Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel 2009 (IMF) 
Chinn-Ito Index of Financial 
Openness  
A measure of the degree of financial openness of a country where higher 
value indicates greater de jure financial openness.  
Chinn & Ito (September 
2008)  
Crisis Dummy  Dummy set to one if a country is experiencing a banking crisis 
Laeven Banking Crisis 
Database 
Financial Reform Index 
Measure of financial reform. Normalized from 0 to 1. (1 stands for fully 
liberalized) 
Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel 2009 (IMF) 
GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth annual % 
World Development 
Indicator (World Bank) 
International capital liberalization 
Measure of restrictions and regulations on international financial 
transactions 
Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel 2009 (IMF) 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP 
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, calculated using the following deflation 
method: {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is liquid 
liabilities, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI 
Financial Structure 
Database (World Bank)  35 
 
Ln(number of banks)  The number of banks used in the analyses each year for each country 
Datastream & 
BankScope 
Political Globalization  Index of political globalization 
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
Security market liberalization 
Government policies related to development of securities markets and 
restrictions on foreign investors 
Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel 2009 (IMF) 
Social Globalization  Index of social globalization 
KOF Index of 
Globalization 
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP 
Value of listed shares to GDP, calculated using the following deflation  
method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is stock 
market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a  is average 
annual CPI 
Financial Structure 
Database (World Bank)  
Stock Market Turnover Ratio 
Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market 
capitalization, the denominator is deflated using the following method:  
Tt/P_at/{(0.5)*[Mt/P_et + Mt-1/P_et-1] where T is total value traded, M 
is stock market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI P_a is average 
annual CPI 
Financial Structure 
Database (World Bank)  
Trade / GDP  Total exports plus total imports to current GDP  
World Development 





Table A2.  Summary Statistics of Country Variables 
This table shows the summary statistics of country-level variables used in this paper.  The variables are described in detail in 
Table A1.   36 
 
Variable name  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Bank capital / assets  595  7.820  2.798  2.700  15.900 
Bank Concentration  804  0.650  0.213  0.119  1.000 
Bank Deposit / GDP  745  0.733  0.582  0.124  4.724 
Bank liquid reserves / assets  738  6.611  7.988  -7.877  57.049 
Banking supervision  728  1.739  0.829  0.000  3.000 
Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness  754  1.318  1.405  -1.831  2.500 
Crisis Dummy  814  0.127  0.333  0.000  1.000 
Financial Reform Index  684  0.834  0.144  0.345  1.000 
GDP per capita growth  782  2.797  3.163  -14.296  16.236 
International capital liberalization  728  2.346  0.881  0.000  3.000 
Ln(number of banks)  814  2.182  1.128  0.000  6.719 
Political Globalization  782  81.436  17.584  3.496  98.431 
Security market liberalization  728  2.190  0.837  0.000  3.000 
Social Globalization  782  66.495  18.299  25.823  94.573 
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP  786  0.905  0.869  0.036  7.425 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  797  0.791  0.829  0.001  6.224 
Trade/GDP  774  90.946  70.076  15.841  438.092 
 
 
 
 